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On the term structure of default premia in the swap and LIBOR markets
Existing theories ofthe term structure ofswap rates provide ananalysis of the Treasury-swap spread
based on either a liquidity convenience yield in the Treasury market, or default risk in the swap market.
While these models do not focus on the relation between corporate yields and swap rates (the LIBOR-
Swap spread), they imply that the term structure of corporate yields and swap rates should be identical.
As documented previously (e.g. in Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993)) this is counter-factual. Here, we
propose a simple model of the (complex) default risk imbedded in the swap term structure that is able
to explain the LIBOR-swap spread. Whereas corporate bonds carry default risk, we argue that swaps
should bear less default risk. In fact, we assume that swap contracts are free of default risk. Because
swaps are indexed on “refreshed”-credit-quality LIBOR rates, the spread between corporate yields and
swap rates should capture the market’s expectations of the probability of deterioration in credit quality
of a corporate bond issuer. We model this feature and use our model to estimate the likelihood of
future deterioration in credit quality from the LIBOR-swap spread. The analysis is important because
it shows that the term structure of swap rates does not reﬂect the borrowing cost of a standard LIBOR
credit quality issuer. It also has implications for modeling the dynamics of the swap term structure.1 Introduction
Existing models of swap rates focus on the spread between swap rates and Treasury yields. In this
article, we extend the analysis and provide a direct comparison of the term structures of swap rates and
of corporate bond yields.
An interest rate swap is a contract by which a ﬁxed payment stream is exchanged against a ﬂoating
payment stream. The ﬂoating leg of the swap is usually set at the interbank interest rate for the relevant
currency (typically the 6-month LIBOR for dollar swaps). Once the ﬂoating leg is speciﬁed, the market
rate for a swap is simply the coupon rate on the ﬁxed leg of the swap. The generic swap rate applies to
a top-quality client rated AA or better. Dealers use this market rate as a reference when they quote an
actual swap rate to a client and adjust for default risk and other characteristics of the client. In this paper
we only consider generic swaps quoted for top-quality counterparties. We do not study the adjustment
that is to be made to the generic swap rate for a more risky counterparty.1 Swaps are quoted for various
maturities; hence there exists a term structure of swap rates that can be compared to the term structures
of Treasury yields and of defaultable corporate bond yields. For illustrative purposes we present the
“average” term structures for the period 10/12/88 to 01/29/97 in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1: The average term structure of swap rates, corporate and Treasury yields: December 1998 to January
1997. All term structures are expressed in semi-annual, actual/365 convention. Data is taken from Datastream
and is described in section 4.
As expected, the swap curve is well above the Treasury curve. More interestingly, casual obser-
vation suggests that the swap curve is below the corporate curve,2 and that the LIBOR-Swap spread
1 Studies of the adjustment in the swap rate done to reﬂect the credit quality of different counterpartiescan be
found in Sorensen and Bollier (1995), Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993), Dufﬁe Huang (1996).
2 In the empirical work, we use data on LIBOR bonds as measures of the yields on defaultable corporate
bonds. LIBOR bonds are ﬁxed-coupon bonds negotiated OTC and issued by top-quality corporate bond issuers
(usually banks and ﬁnancial institutions) rated AA or better. Hence, we will call “LIBOR-swap” the spread
between yields on LIBOR-quality bonds and LIBOR swap rates for all quoted maturities; for example, the 5-
year LIBOR-swap spread is the spread between the yield on a 5-year LIBOR bond and the ﬁxed rate on a 5-year
1is increasing with maturity. The average spread (across maturities and dates) between LIBOR bond
yields and swap rates is around
1
5 basis points. It is, by construction, zero at 6-months to maturity.
Our intent is to develop a model that explains this spread between corporate bond yields and swap rates
(LIBOR-swap spread) and its dynamics.
Although swap rates are often quoted relative to Treasury yields for practical reasons (the Treasury
term structure is widely-available and continuously-updated), the important comparison for swap rates
is with corporate bond yields of similar credit quality. While the LIBOR-swap spread only amounts
to a few basis points3 it can be of signiﬁcant ﬁnancial importance. Corporate issuers measure their
spreads relative to the swap curve rather than to the Treasury curve which is different in terms of credit
quality, and exhibits signiﬁcant institutional and regulatory distortions (such as repo specials, taxes and
perhaps liquidity). Swaps are often used by corporate issuers in complex ﬁnancing packages involving
corporate bonds in order to gain some ﬁnancing cost reduction compared to issuing plain-vanilla bonds.
Bankers use the swap curve, in lieu of the corporate curve, as the basic tool for pricing corporate assets
and liabilities. This practice originates from the observation that swap rates are continuously quoted
(and traded) for a wide range of maturities and therefore more readily updated than corporate yields.
Yet it is justiﬁed only if the swap term structure truly reﬂects the cost of ﬁnancing of a top-rated
corporate issuer for the various maturities. In this paper we argue that the LIBOR-swap spread, is not
to be dismissed as simply resulting form data problems (or liquidity), but that it should exist on purely
theoretical grounds.
The focus of extant models of the swap term structure4 has been the analysis of the spread between
Treasury yields and swap rates. Little has been done to explain the spread between corporate bond
yields and swap rates, and most existing models are not well-suited to explain that spread. Grinblatt
(1995) and Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997) provide models where the swap term structure can be modeled
as a two-factor term structure in the traditional sense of factor models of the risk-free term structure.
But the two papers justify the two-factor model in very different ways.
Grinblatt (1995) proposes a model where both swap contracts and Treasury bonds are free ofdefault
risk. The swap-Treasury spread arises because of a “liquidity convenience yield5” accruing to the
holder of a government-issued security. Effectively, Grinblatt assumes that the swap term structure
is the true “risk-free” term structure, which, in turn, implies that the 6-month LIBOR rate must be
regarded as a default risk free rate.
Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997) avoid this problem by introducing default risk on swap contracts. They
model the term structure of swap rates using an approach to default risk developed in Dufﬁe and Sin-
gleton (1999). Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997) in effect justify the use of a traditional two-factor model
of a risk-free term structure for modeling the term structure of swap rates in a framework where both
swaps and LIBOR bonds carry default risk. Their major contribution is to allow a model-based inter-
polation of the observed swap term structure. This is important for the purpose of pricing outstanding
swaps whose maturities do not match the round years quoted by swap dealers. However, their model
relies on a set of assumptions, discussed at length by the authors, which have major implications for
the LIBOR-swap spread. Indeed, in their model, the swap term structure would be identical to the
LIBOR yield term structure (see their equations 3 and 4). In other words, their model implies that the
LIBOR swap, with all parties of top-credit quality.
3 The LIBOR-swap spread is usually well above the swap bid-ask spread, which only amounts to a couple of
basis points for generic swaps.
4 Earlier work include Solnik (1990), Sundaresan (1991), Cooper and Mello (1991).
5 Grinblatt models this as an exogenous factor, similarly to convenience yields in the forward contract litera-
ture.
2swap rate be equal to the LIBOR yield not only for the 6-month maturity (which should be the case),
but also for all maturities. This is due to two key assumptions made by Dufﬁe and Singleton, namely:
“homogeneous LIBOR-swap credit quality” and “refreshed credit quality” of LIBOR counter-parties.
The “homogeneous LIBOR-swap credit quality” assumption implies that swap contracts and LI-
BOR bonds have the same default risk, and hence that all cash ﬂows pertaining to either contract
should be discounted under the risk-neutral measure using the same risk-adjusted rate. However, as
the authors recognize, it is very likely that “default scenarios in the two markets, recovery rates may
differ”(p.1294). In fact as we discuss below, it is very likely that swaps be not impacted at all by default
risk so that they should be treated as default risk-free, unlike LIBOR bonds which carry AA default
risk.
The “refreshed credit quality” of LIBOR counter-parties assumption presumes that the counter-
parties will maintain the same credit quality over time. Our subsequent analysis shows that this as-
sumption may be very inappropriate to understand the LIBOR-swap spread.6
Our approach extends their analysis to provide a better understanding of the relation between the
rates on swaps and on LIBOR bonds of similar maturity. To do so, it is essential to relax the two
simplifying assumptions mentioned above.
First, we introduce “non-homogeneous” credit quality between the swap and corporate-bond mar-
kets. It is now widely recognized7 that corporate bonds bear more credit risk than swaps written by the
same counterparties. The nature of the swap contract makes default on swaps to be much less costly
than on bonds. The potential loss on a swap does not include the principal but simply an interest rate
differential (e.g. ﬁxed minus ﬂoating), and only in the case where this difference is positive for the
non-defaulting party (i.e. if interest rate movements have led to a positive swap market value for the
non-defaulting party). Furthermore, this potential loss is often reduced or eliminated by the posting
of collateral or marking-to-market provisions, as well as other contractual provisions in case of credit
downgrading of a party. Some further argue that a swap between two parties of similar credit quality
should entail no default risk premium in either direction because of the symmetric nature of the con-
tract.8 So the impact of credit risk on the pricing of a generic swap should at best be minimal.9 Hence it
seems essential to use different risk-adjusted rates for corporate bonds and swap contracts issued by the
same party. In this article we assume that the payoffs of a generic swap are basically priced as if free
of default risk: the discount factor adjusted for default risk to be used under the risk-neutral measure to
price swap contracts for AA parties is the risk-free interest rate. However, the swap term structure will
be different from (and above) the risk-free term structure, because the swap rate payments are indexed
on 6-month LIBOR which is a default-risky rate. Hence, the swap rate will be higher than the risk-free
rate even though the swap contract is free of default risk. On the other hand, the fact that swap contracts
are less risky than LIBOR bonds, does not necessarily imply that swap rates be lower than LIBORbond
yields. This may at ﬁrst sound counterintuitive, but is, in fact, just a result of the swap payments being
6 Some indication can be found in the empirical analysis conducted by Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997). Indeed,
whereas their model is able to interpolate the swap rates for maturities ranging from 2 to 10 years pretty well,
they ﬁnd that “the ﬁtted LIBOR is about 18 basis point too small on average and is more volatile than the actual
LIBOR” (page 1307). In other words, the swap term structure in their model is 18 basis points lower than the
LIBOR term structure for short maturities, despite the fact they should be identical at a 6-month horizon. Of
course, we should stress that Dufﬁe and Singleton make these assumptions to allow the “ﬁctitious” refreshed-
quality LIBOR bondyields to be used to approximateswap rates. They never suggest that an actual LIBOR bond
should be priced of the swap curve.
7 See Litzenberger (1992) and Solnik(1990),
8 See Sorensen and Bollier (1994) and Dufﬁe and Huang (1996).
9 We do not study the issue of swap pricing when one of the counter-parties is of lesser credit quality. Dufﬁe
and Huang (1996) show that such a difference in credit risk has little impact on swap rates.
3indexed on the short end of the LIBOR bond yield curve. As an example, the swap rate on a swap with
a 6-month maturity is always equal to the 6-month LIBOR rate by design of the contract, no matter
what the difference in credit risk is between the swap contract and the 6-month LIBOR bond.
Second, we relax the “refreshed-credit-quality” assumption. The swap contract is contractually
indexed on the 6-month LIBOR rate, which is a refreshed top-credit-quality rate. On the other hand,
long-term LIBOR bonds are priced to reﬂect the likelihood that the credit quality of a top-rated issuer
may deteriorate over the life of the bond. Thus our analysis implies that the LIBOR-swap spread
captures the likelihood that an issuer’s credit quality may change over time.
We show that a model that accounts for (1) the difference in credit risk between swap contracts and
top-quality corporate bonds and (2) the difference in credit quality of a constantly updated, refreshed
credit quality index and that of a speciﬁc top-rated issuer that may experience a depreciation in credit-
quality, can reasonably explain the observed spread and its dynamics.
Of course there may be other factors, which could further explain the dynamics of the LIBOR-
swap spread, such as liquidity. Although we are not aware of documented liquidity events in the
LIBOR-swap market (e.g. comparable to the repo specialness in the Treasury market), it is possible
that the greater notional transaction volume of the swap market is an indicator for greater liquidity
and that this may affect pricing. A pragmatic answer could be to reinterpret our results and consider
that our instantaneous credit spread, which enters the adjusted rate used to discount under the risk-
neutral measure, reﬂects both credit risk and swap-LIBOR liquidity differential (in the spirit of Dufﬁe
and Singleton (1997)). But the two effects cannot be disentangled. Absent a theory for liquidity,
and in light of the widespread use of the swap term structure in lieu of a top-quality corporate-bond
term structure, it seems useful to provide an explanation of the LIBOR-swap spread, based solely on
a realistic default-risk model. The task of isolating and quantifying the impact of liquidity relative to
default-risk is left to further research.
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present our model for corporate bond yields
and swap rates. We examine some of the implications of our model for LIBOR-swap spreads in section
3. An empirical validation is provided in section 4. We conclude in section 5. Formulas are provided
in an appendix.
2 The model
Our intent is to develop a very simple model that can provide some qualitative as well as realistic
quantitative implications about the (relative) pricing of two securities: the zero-coupon defaultable












t and the swap contract (initiated at
time











































￿). As is usual in this literature,
we denote by “risk-free,” securities that are free of default risk, but not necessarily of interest-rate
risk. We denote by “risky” securities with default risk. Hence, with our previous assumptions, swap
contracts are “risk-free,” but LIBOR bonds are “risky.” They all obviously carry interest-rate risk.10
10 Since we focuson pricingsecurities in this section all processesare speciﬁed underthe risk-neutralmeasure.
We take a risk-neutral measure
Q as given, and discuss the issue of risk-premia in the empirical section.
42.1 The LIBOR bond term structure
Although top quality, these corporate LIBOR bonds carry default risk, and this feature is essential to
the proper understanding of the swap term structure. We adopt the so-called reduced form to default-
risk modeling discussed by Dufﬁe and Singleton (1999). In this framework, default is an unpredictable
stopping time modeled by the ﬁrst occurrence of a point process with stochastic intensity, not neces-
sarily related to the value of the corporate bond or the value of the ﬁrm’s assets. In other words, we
implicitly “assume” that the bond is small relative to the overall portfolio of assets of the ﬁrm.

























This formula simply states that the present value of risky cash ﬂows may be found by discounting them









) plus an instantaneous credit spread, which is simply
the instantaneous expected loss rate under the risk-neutral measure. As discussed in the introduction,
if there was a big pricing impact of the relative liquidity between the swap and LIBOR markets, then
the risk-adjusted rate should be interpreted as a mixed liquidity and credit risk factor (as in Dufﬁe and
Singleton (1997)).
Notice that formula (1) implies that risky bonds can be priced just like risk-free bonds by simply





as the sum of two independent factors, the risky term structure of interest rates would simply become
a traditional two-factor model of the term structure. This is the route followed by Dufﬁe and Singleton
(1997) in their model of the swap-rate term structure.
However, it seems unlikely that such a speciﬁcation of the instantaneous credit spread for top-
rated credit quality issuers be appropriate. Indeed, theoretical (Merton (1974), Jarrow, Lando and
Turnbull (1997)) as well as empirical (Sarig and Warga (1989) and Fons (1994)) evidence shows that
the term structure of credit spreads exhibit systematic patterns, which are not well-captured by standard
processes used for modeling the risk-free term structure.11 In light of this evidence, we put more
structure on our model of the instantaneous credit-spread process to allow for possible deterioration of
credit quality of the LIBOR bond issuers.























































































































) are deterministic functions of
















) is equal to the number of jumps in credit quality between
t















) may be stochastic. This model implies that when the credit
quality of the issuer deteriorates, his credit spread jumps up by a discrete amount
￿
1. At the same time,
there is an adjustment in the long term mean of the credit spread which jumps up by a discrete amount
￿
2.13










































































































r are at most deterministic functions of time.









































































t. The Gaussian processes used to model
r
and
￿ present some well-known shortcomings (negative values and homoskedasticity). We choose the
Gaussian framework mainly for tractability reasons as our goal is to derive closed-form solutions that
provide intuition about the relative impact of the refreshed credit quality and non-homogeneous credit
quality assumption on the LIBOR-swap spread.14
One can show (e.g. using standard techniques developed in, for example, Dufﬁe and Kan (1996),
Das and Foresi (1996)) that the risky zero-coupon bond prices of a at time
t top-rated issuer, are given
























































































































































Care the standard deterministic functions appearing in the computation of a zero-
coupon bond (see appendix). Notice that
P
￿




￿, which, when coefﬁcients are constant, is the special case of Langetieg’s (1980) model







12 This point process is assumed to have no common jumps with the point process that triggers default. This
is a technical assumption which is necessary for expression (1) to be valid. It merely states that default and
deterioration cannot occur at exactly the same instant of time. Of course, any deterioration in credit quality
implies that the probability of a default increases.
13 Since we focus on top-quality counter-parties, we consider only deterioration of credit quality. The model
can easily be extended to include possible appreciation in credit quality, for example by adding a point process
for downward jumps in the instantaneous credit-spread process.
14 Notice also that negative credit spreads can be interpreted as (presumably rare) situations in which default
is expected to result in recovery of more than the market value of the bond just prior to bankruptcy. For ex-
ample, when bankruptcy negotiation is done on the grounds of outstanding principal values, the proportion of








) can be viewed as the marginal increase in the yield on a defaultable
zero-coupon bond, issued at
t by a top-rated ﬁrm and maturing at




This model has interesting implications for the top-rated credit quality credit spread. In particular,





) is a non-decreasing function of time, the present
model is able to capture the systematic patterns observed for top-rated credit-risky bonds, namely that







), to be the difference between the yield on a defaultable bond and a risk-free












































































































This illustrates that as the maturity tends to zero the spread tends to the instantaneous credit spread for
“refreshed credit quality” top-rated issuers. On the other hand, as maturity increases towards inﬁnity,
the spread tends towards the limiting spread of a “refreshed credit quality” issuer plus the instantaneous
probability of credit depreciation.15
As for most existing models of credit-risk, in our framework, a coupon-paying bond can be priced






) paid semi-annually by a corporate
bond issued at par at time
t and maturing at time
t
+

































2.2 The swap term structure
We consider a plain-vanilla or generic swap indexed on 6-month LIBOR, with the three usual charac-
teristics C1 the payments are indexed on a lagged ﬂoating-index value, C2 the reset lag of the ﬂoating








) as the ﬁxed rate to be paid semi-annually for
￿ years in a generic swap entered
at date







). 6-month LIBOR is deﬁned by the short end of














































15 The intuition for the fact that the size of the jump in credit spread
￿ does not appear in the formula, is that













1 . Indeed, conditional on jumps occurring,the instantaneousexpected risk-adjusted rate grows linearly






16 All widely used credit risk models share the feature that coupon bonds can be priced from zero-coupon
bonds, e.g. Dufﬁe Singleton (1999), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997).
7As discussed above, the swap contract is considered as risk-free. Consequently, the discount rate




) deﬁned above. By deﬁnition of the swap,
Y
￿





































































































































































0 are given in equations A.7 and A.8 in the appendix. The
expression derived above for the ﬁxed rate on a swap looks complicated. However, it is simple to





























The ﬁxed rate paid on longer-term swaps can be interpreted as a weighted average of forward LIBOR


































1). There are two correction factors
C and
C
0. The former is













) accounts for the possibility of jumps in
the instantaneous credit spread of the LIBOR rates that serve as a reference for the ﬂoating leg of the
swap.
The link between the ﬁxed rate on a swap and a weighted average of forward rates has been under-
lined in previous literature on swaps17 Our formula is very different from previous models because it
accounts for (1) differences in credit risk between swap contracts and LIBOR bonds, and (2) the differ-
ence between a continuously upgraded refreshed credit quality LIBOR rate and the yield on a typical
LIBOR counter-party which reﬂects possible future jumps in credit quality.
Before weturn tothe discussion ofthese issues, wewould like toshortly mention the swap-Treasury
spread. The swap spread is often quoted with respect to the yield on a government bond with equivalent
maturity. Although both contracts are free of default risk in our model, the swap rate is different from
the Treasury rate. As we have seen, the 6-month swap rate is equal to the 6-month LIBOR rate by
deﬁnition of the swap contract (equation 17). So the swap term structure is “anchored” at the 6-month
LIBOR,which is clearly higher than the 6-month Treasury yield, because the LIBORrate reﬂects credit
risk. More generally, the swap term structure depends on the credit-risk process since the ﬂoating leg
of the swap contract is indexed on the 6-month LIBOR rate. Even though the swap contract is free of
default risk, the swap rate depends on the credit-risk process through the ﬂoating leg indexation (it is a
risk-free contract written on a risky underlying rate). As a consequence, the dynamics of the swap rates
depend on the dynamics of the credit-risk process and, hence, differ from the dynamics of the Treasury
rates. The swap-Treasury spread is, typically, not constant across maturities in our model.
3 A better picture of the LIBOR-swap spread?
In this section we provide some intuition for the respective impact on the LIBOR-swap spread of
our two main assumptions (as deﬁned in the introduction): (1) “homogeneous vs. non homogeneous
17 See for example Sundaresan (1991) and Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997).
8LIBOR-swap credit quality” and (2)“refreshed vs. non refreshed credit quality” in the LIBOR market.
If we were to assume, as in Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997), that there is both “homogeneous LIBOR-
swap credit quality” and “refreshed credit quality” of the LIBOR counter-parties, then the swap rate





































































































). Obviously in that case the swap rate is equal to the LIBOR-bond
yield for all maturities (see Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997) and Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993)). But,
we observe the existence of a LIBOR-swap spread. And, as discussed in the introduction, there seems
to be a general consensus about the fact that swap contract carry less default risk than corporate bonds.
Thus, it seems natural to ﬁrst investigate whether relaxing the assumption of “homogeneous LIBOR-
swap credit quality,” can explain the observed LIBOR-Swap spread.18
3.1 Non-homogeneous credit quality between swap and LIBOR markets
We still assume that the swap contract is risk-free whereas LIBOR bonds are risky, as in our model
presented in section 2. However, we now assume that there is no possibility of jumps in the credit
spread so that the corporate bond is assumed to always remain of “refreshed credit quality.” Then our
















































































C is as deﬁned previously. The factor
C is in fact just a
“Jensen-inequality effect” which in practice is very close to
1.19 Thus the major effect of introduc-
ing non-homogeneity between swap and LIBOR bond markets is to change the weighting of for-
ward LIBOR rates in computing the swap rate. Indeed a comparison of equations (19) with (18)
for the case where
C
=
1 shows that the only impact of introducing non-homogeneous credit qual-























































) in the non-homogeneous case. Simple algebra reveals that the slope of the
forward-LIBOR curve dictates the relation between LIBOR bond yields and swap rates. We summa-
rize this relation in the following proposition:20
Proposition 1 Assume (1) the swap contract is (default-) risk-free, (2) the LIBOR bond is default
risky, (3) LIBOR bonds are sure to maintain their credit quality (refreshed credit quality), and (4)
C
is negligible (i.e. ‘close’ to
1). Then, when the forward-LIBOR curve is upward-sloping (downward-
sloping), the swap rate curve should be above (below) the LIBOR bond yield curve.
For example, the swap rate curve will be above the LIBOR bond yield curve when the forward-
LIBOR rates are increasing with maturity. This result is purely a consequence of the indexation mech-
anism of swap contract.
18 Again “Non-homogeneouscredit quality”states that genericswap contracts are less risky than AA corporate
bonds, not that the two counterparties of the swap have different credit qualities.
19 This statement is easily checked for reasonable parameter values. For example with parameter values as




















20 The proof is provided in an appendix.
9The proposition above shows that relaxing the “homogeneous swap-LIBOR credit quality” alone
will not explain the observed LIBOR-swap credit spreads. Since on average we observe upward-
sloping LIBOR curves and increasing forward-LIBOR curves, the above proposition implies that the
swap curve should be mostly above the corporate rate curve. Empirically, however, we observe the
opposite as documented in Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993).
In the next section we provide some intuition for the importance of relaxing the assumption of
“refreshed credit quality” to explain the positive LIBOR-swap spread.
3.2 Relaxing the “refreshed-credit-quality” assumption
We claim that the LIBOR-swap spread reﬂects the probability in credit deterioration of a top-quality
LIBOR counter-party. Indeed, by contractual deﬁnition, the swap contract is indexed on a refreshed
LIBOR rate index, which is continuously updated so as to maintain its credit quality. On the other hand
a typical LIBOR bond issuer may experience a deterioration in credit quality at anytime which is priced
into the bond yield.
Comparing equations (16) and (19), we see that introducing a positive probability for LIBOR is-
suers to experience jumps in credit quality modiﬁes the swap rate by the factor
C
0. This term captures
the possible change in credit quality over time and can be viewed as the difference between two credit
risks. The ﬁrst applies to an issuer with refreshed top-credit quality on all reset dates (as implicit in
the swap rate) and the second applies to an issuer who was of top-credit quality at time of issue,
t (as
implicit in the LIBOR bond yield).
To understand the intuition, consider the exposure on a 10-year-maturity corporate bond versus a
10-year swap. Compare the default spread on the cash ﬂow of one particular maturity, say in 7 years.
Holding a 10-year corporate bond entitles one to receive a coupon in 7 years if there has not been
any previous default. The value of that coupon depends on the expected recovery rate of a cash-ﬂow
received in 7 years by a today top-rated ﬁrm. On the other hand, the cash ﬂow to be received in 7
years in a (default-risk-free) swap contract incorporates default risk only through the ﬂoating index,
which depends on the expected recovery rate on a 6-month defaultable bond issued by a ﬁrm that will
be top-rated in 6.5 years.
3.3 Model-implied spreads between refreshed-quality-LIBOR yieldsand LIBOR yields
Our previous analysis has highlighted the importance for the LIBOR-swap spread of differentiating
between a continuously updated refreshed credit quality counter-party risk and the risk of a speciﬁc
counter-party that may experience jumps in credit quality. In fact, wehave argued that the LIBOR-swap
spread reﬂects the potential credit-depreciation risk of typical LIBOR-credit quality counter-parties. In
this section, we use our model to provide some insights about the cost paid by a typical LIBOR counter-
party for potential jumps in their future credit risk. This cost can be measured within our framework
as the difference between the yield paid by a top-rated issuer computed using equation (8), and that
paid by a refreshed credit quality issuer computed using the same formula, but setting the intensity of
credit-deterioration to zero (
￿
=
0).21. The non-refreshed bond corresponds to a typical top-quality
corporate bond, while the refreshed-quality bond is ﬁctitious. The refreshed-credit quality bond does
not carry any credit-deterioration risk, but may be defaulted upon anytime. The standard corporate
bond reﬂects both: it may default at anytime and it may experience deterioration in its credit quality.
21 We thank a referee for suggesting this analysis.
10Figure 2 shows the spread in bond yields between top-rated issuers with constant expected instan-


























0 ). Of course, the constant
expected instantaneous downgrading can result from different combinations of jump size and intensity






















1). All other parameter values correspond to those
estimated in the next section, Table 1. The values of the instantaneous risk-free rate and of the credit
spread are set at their long-term means.
Figure 2: Term structures of spreads between yields of non-refreshed and refreshed credit quality corporate
bonds as implied by the model. All parameter values are taken from the estimated values in Table 1 below. We





























Figure 2 shows that the spread between non-refreshed and refreshed credit quality bond yields is
economically signiﬁcant, increasing with maturity, reaching 60 bp at a 20-year maturity. Interestingly,
the ﬁgure also reveals that the spread has a slightly different sensitivity to size and intensity of credit
depreciation risk. For a constant expected depreciation in credit quality, the credit spread is actually
increasing in jump intensity but decreasing in size. In other words, credit spreads are more sensitive to
changes in intensity than to changes in the size of the jump in credit spreads.22 This was also suggested
by the limiting results derived in equation (12).
As the results above show, the hypothetically constructed refreshed credit quality curve is different
22 Intuition suggests this result is due to the convexity of bond prices. Consider a simple 1 period risky bond




























R. The convexity of the function
e
￿
x implies that the zero
coupon bond price is increasing in
￿ for a given
￿















































Thus for a given expected depreciation rate
P is decreasing in intensity
￿ and increasing in jump size
￿.O f
course, yields move in opposite direction.
11from the corporate bond curve, and the difference measures the cost paid by a top-quality issuer for
the likelihood of being downgraded over the life of the bond. The refreshed credit quality curve is
also different from the swap rate curve, simply because swap contracts are free of default risk, whereas
the refreshed credit quality contracts carry default risk associated with a top-rated counter-party. But,
Data on swap rates can be used along with the actual LIBOR data to infer the likelihood of credit-risk
deterioration for a top-quality LIBOR issuer.
4 Some empirical results
Using data on Treasury bond yields, LIBORbond yields and swaprates wenow estimate the parameters
of our model. This allows us to determine the signiﬁcance of the deterioration in credit quality of top-
rated issuers implicit in the LIBOR-swap spread.23 We shortly describe the data and econometric
methodology used and discuss the empirical results.
4.1 Data and econometric methodolgy
We use weekly data for Treasury, LIBOR par-bond and swap rates from October 12, 1988 to January 29
1997. The data were obtained from Datastream. Datastream reports the mid swap rates24 quoted by a
major swap dealer for maturities of 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 years. Treasury bond data covers the maturities:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 years. Finally we use the LIBOR yields reported by Datastream for maturities
0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years. These are quoted yields for ﬁxed-coupon par-bonds negotiated OTC and
issued by corporate issuers (usually banks and ﬁnancial institutions) rated AA or better.25
In order to subject our model to empirical scrutiny, we make a few simplifying assumptions. We















￿. In words, we assume that when the credit quality
deteriorates, both the long-term mean and the level of the credit spreads jump by an equal amount, and
that the probability of credit deterioration is constant. Because of a well-known indeterminacy arising
in such models (Duffee (1999), Dufﬁe and Singleton (1999)) we cannot estimate
￿ the intensity of
the jump separately from





We also need to make assumptions about the risk premia asociated with our three stochastic factors,
because our data is observed under the historical
P-measure whereas we have speciﬁed the processes
under the risk-neutral measure. For the empirical implementation we simply assume risk-premia to be
23 We use Treasuries as a proxy for the “true” risk-free rate even though they are often claimed to offer ad-
vantages over and above the risk-free asset, such as liquidity and taxes. This allows us to isolate the different
component of the LIBOR-swap spread and give some economic interpretation to our results. Notice that since
we estimate the LIBOR-swap spread, we may reasonably hope this will not have a big impact on our estimation
of the instantaneous credit-risk process.
24 The bid and ask swap rates quoted depend on the credit quality of the customer. The bid-mid and mid-ask
spreads for a generic swap quoted to a AAA or AA customer are generally equal to one basis point over the
period. As mentioned in Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993) and Cossin and Pirotte (1997), the spreads increase
by a few basis points for a lesser-rated customer.
25 The market is pretty liquid, see Sun, Sundaresan and Wang (1993) for a discussion of the LIBOR bond
market and comparisons of the Datastream-data with alternative data sets. Further details on our data set can can
be found in an appendix.
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￿ (empirically it is



















). We thus choose to



























￿ the risk premia associated
with interest-rate risk and generic “refreshed credit quality” credit spread. The risk premia capture the
shift in distribution going from the physical measure
P to the risk-neutral measure
Q.28
To further reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, we constrain the autocorrelation coef-
ﬁcient for all the error terms to be the same. We thus have a total of 16 parameters to estimate.
We use maximum-likelihood estimation using both time-series and cross-sectional data in the spirit
of Chen and Scott (1993). The approach consists in using three arbitrarily chosen yields, e.g. a swap





￿) using formulas in (8) and (16) and given
a vector or parameter values. The remaining yields, which, at any point in time, are also deterministic
functions of the state variables are then over identiﬁed. Following Chen and Scott (1993), we assume
these other yields are priced or measured with ‘error.’29 Given the known transition density for the state
variables and some assumed distribution for the error terms, the likelihood can be derived.
4.2 Results
Estimated parameters are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter estimates resulting from the Maximum Likelihood described in section 4.2. all parameters are presented





























































They are quite reasonable and statistically signiﬁcant except for the risk-premia on central ten-




￿). The long-run mean of the risk-free rate under the
27 Since we do not observe actual jumps in the jump process, we cannot estimate the change of measure (i.e.
of intensity). In other words, we can only estimate the risk-neutral expected credit-risk depreciation.
28 In the gaussian framework, risk-premia have a simple interpretation. In our notation,
￿
￿ is the amount
which must be added to the risk-neutral long-term mean
￿ to obtain the long-term mean of the short rate under












￿ process. Except of course,
that
￿
r denotes the amount by which the whole path of
￿ has to be shifted. Notice that our deﬁnition is slightly
different from the traditional risk-premium, because we ﬁnd the adjustment in terms of the change in long-term
means more intuitive. Of course, Girsanov’s theorem gives the relation between the brownian motions and the














29 Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997) use a similar method. Alternatively, we could have used a Kalman-ﬁlter to
avoid making an arbitrary assumption on which yields are priced without errors.





￿, are negative, im-
plying that term premia are positive and increasing with maturity.30 It appears that the level factor of
the risk-free term structure has relatively low mean-reversion (10%) and volatility (1%) compared to
the second-factor, the long run tendency, which appears to have high mean-reversion (50%) and high
volatility (8%). This is in line with the results of Jegadeesh and Pennacchi (1996) who interpret the
central tendency as a proxy for a long run interest rate target, thus reﬂecting expectation about future
inﬂation rates. On the other hand, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the long-run ten-
dency and the short-term rate.31 The long-run mean of the instantaneous credit spread for top-rated









2). The credit-deterioration param-
eter




￿ is the expected depreciation rate in credit quality.32 Our ﬁndings thus imply that the spread
between LIBOR par-bond yields and swap rates is consistent with top-quality LIBOR issuers expe-
riencing, on average, a depreciation in credit quality of 5 basis points per year under the risk-neutral
measure. This is economically signiﬁcant and implies an increasing term structure of credit spreads for
top-rated LIBOR issuers.






7) implying that the credit spread tends to decrease when the risk-free rate rises.33 Interestingly,
the correlation between the long-run tendency of the treasury term structure and the credit-risk process
is positive. There are also macro-economic explanations that can be called upon to explain the correla-
tion between interest rates and the credit spread. For example, one may argue that the Treasury curve
ﬂattens as a response to a slow-down in economic activity which should translate into higher spreads
to compensate for credit risk. Part of the latter effect may actually be captured in our model by the
correlation between the short rate and the credit spread.
It is interesting to assess the quality of the estimation by looking at the properties of the error terms
for the various swap, LIBOR and Treasury rates, with maturities ranging from 0.5 to 10 years.
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of the conditional errors (
￿
i) inbp resulting from theMaximum Likelihood estimation
described in section 4.2. Notice that the 1-year and 5-year Treasury and 1-year LIBOR are ﬁtted perfectly because they are
chosen for inversion.
Maturity 0.5 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 7 years 10 years average
mean (Treasury yields) N.A. 0 0.4 -0.0 0.2 0 0.3 0.3 -0.06
R.M.S.E N.A. 0 4.7 3.9 2.6 0 3.3 4.3 3.8
mean (Swap rates) N.A. N.A. -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5
R.M.S.E N.A. N.A. 5.4 4.6 4.2 3.7 4.5 4.8 4.5
mean (LIBOR rates) 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.0 N.A. N.A. 0.1
R.M.S.E 8.9 0 7.4 8.7 8.9 9.1 N.A. N.A. 8.1
30 Term premia are deﬁned as the expected return on a risk-free bond in excess of the instantaneous risk-free
























31 Jegadeesh and Pennacchi are unable to precisely estimate that correlation, but they propose two possible
interpretations depending on the sign of the correlation. We refer the reader to their discussion, p. 435-436.
32 Unfortunately, as in Duffee (1999), we cannot disentangle the probability of downgrading from the jump
size in the level of the instantaneous credit spread. In principle, if we had time-series data on individual credit-
risky bond prices, our model would allow to estimate both parameters separately. Here, since for comparison
with genericswap rates we use onlygenericLIBOR yields at contractinitiation, we have no observationof actual
credit-depreciationevents. It would be interesting to analyze individual corporate-bonddata, as in Duffee (1999)
for example, using our model of corporate bonds.
33 This is also consistent with the recent results in Duffee (1998) and Duffee (1999).
14The error terms (
u







2), but the average and root mean
square errors (R.M.S.E.) of the conditional error terms (
￿
i) are quite low, as can be seen in Table 2.
Depending on the maturity, the mean conditional error ranges from -0.7 bp (basis point) to +.5 bp
across all maturities and all rates. The R.M.S.E is less than 9 bp for all rates and maturities. Notice that
the R.M.S.E is less than 5 bp for swap and Treasury rates and slightly higher for LIBOR rates, i.e the
model does better at capturing the dynamics of the swap and Treasury term structure. This may also
indicate that the dynamics of the downgrading process chosen for this simple application is too simple
and could be improved upon.35
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we study the term structure of the spread between corporate bond yields and swap rates
for top-quality counterparties. Indeed, the swap term structure is widely used by bankers, investors
and borrowers in lieu of the corporate term structure as the basic tool for pricing corporate assets and
liabilities as well as all kinds of ﬁnancial assets. This practice originates from the observation that swap
rates are continuously quoted (and traded) for a wide range of maturities and therefore more readily
updated than corporate yields. Yet it is justiﬁed only if the swap term structure truly reﬂects the cost
of ﬁnancing of a top-rated corporate issuer for the various maturities. Thus it is important to point out
that realistic modeling of default risk leads to a theoretical difference between the two curves (we call
it the “LIBOR-swap spread”).36
Empirically, LIBOR-quality bond yields are in general higher than swap rates with similar matu-
rities. We provide a model that explains this feature. Our two key assumptions are (1) swaps carry
less credit risk than corporate bonds, (2) the credit quality of top-rated issuers may deteriorate over
the life of the contract and in particular differ from that of a continuously updated “refreshed credit
quality” index. The ﬁrst assumption is widely agreed upon. Interestingly, our results show that, alone,
it is not sufﬁcient to explain a positive LIBOR-swap spread. LIBOR bond yields should be mostly
below (not above) swap rates if swaps are free of default risk while LIBOR bonds carry default risk,
and if all counterparties are sure to maintain their credit quality over the life of the contracts. Our
second assumption is thus crucial to explain the observed positive LIBOR-swap spread. Because swap
payments are indexed on the 6-month LIBOR rate, a continuously updated, “refreshed” credit quality
rate, we argue the LIBOR-swap spread captures the expected credit-quality deterioration of a top-rated
credit-quality issuer. We provide an explicit model of the difference between a refreshed credit-quality
term structure and an actual top-rated credit-quality term structure that includes the possible jumps in
credit quality and derive the swap rate in this framework.
Our empirical results show the existence of an economically and statistically signiﬁcant expected
credit-quality deterioration for top-rated LIBOR-bond issuers.
There are several ways in which our work could be extended,37 but we believe that our analysis
highlights an important dimension in swap pricing that has been neglected so far in the academic
literature.
34 Chen and Scott (1993) and Dufﬁe and Singleton (1997) ﬁnd similar results.
35 In an earlier version we also looked at unconditional ﬁtting errors and the volatility of the model implied
spread. Results show a good ﬁt of the model.
36 Although none of the extant theories speciﬁcally study the spread between corporate bond yields and swap
rates - they focus on the Treasury-Swap spread - they imply that these two term structures should be identical.
37 Including: using different processes for the state variables, introducing a stochastic intensity for credit
deterioration, modeling the fact that swap contracts carry some default risk (although less than bonds), adding a
liquidity convenience yield or other factors in the Treasury market.
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16A The formulas
Thisappendix givesthe different formulas used inthe text. Allthederivations, proofs and further details
about theempirical analysis canbe found inan appendix available athttp://www.cmu.edu/user/dufresne












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using (A.3),(A.4) and (A.5), we obtain the risky discount bond prices given in 8.
￿ The swap rate formula










































































































































































































































































After some rearranging and simple algebra, we obtain equation 16 in the text with:
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